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I. INTRODUCTION
When is the last time you ventured through the drive-thru of a fast food
establishment? Maybe last night when it was just easier than taking the time
to cook dinner, or maybe last weekend on your way home from vacation, or
maybe when you were running low on funds and needed a cheap meal?
Given the busy, fast-paced lives Americans lead, it is no wonder that many
rely on the fast food industry, even though most would not care to admit it.
In 2013, 64 percent of U.S. consumers did, in fact, admit to eating at a
fast food restaurant within the past month.' Needless to say, fast food is
something upon which this consumer nation relies, and is both a luxury and
convenience to the people who take advantage of this service. The
hamburger segment of the fast food industry was found to be the most
popular.2 Specifically, McDonald's was determined the most popular brand
in the business as of 2013 in a survey by Judith Karbstein.3
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People may not think about how frequently they take advantage of
these outlets, but what if suddenly fast food restaurants were gone? The
effects of litigation such as Pelman v. McDonald's could mean higher prices
and other barriers, making this a possibility for some consumers.4 Such
lawsuits are lengthy, expensive, and could have a significant impact on the
fast food industry as a whole. The allegation in Pelman was that McDonald's
had caused the plaintiffs' obesity, together with associated health related
problems.' More specifically, plaintiffs alleged McDonald's advertising was
false and misleading in that it failed to warn of the consequences of
consuming its food and led consumers to believe the food was actually
healthy.6 Reliance on these representations led to over-consumption, and
thus weight oriented health issues.7 After nine years of litigation, the suit was
finally voluntarily dismissed by the plaintiffs.8 Whether the parties settled
remains unknown to the general public. The main obstacle to the plaintiffs'
success appears to have been proving the necessary causation.9 Plaintiffs
were not able to prove the direct relation between the food consumed and
resulting health problems; mainly because each individual is unique and a
number of different considerations can affect one's health. 0
These types of lawsuits threaten the food industry as a whole, not just
the fast food segment, and it is likely that courts will see more of such obesity
suits in the future. Causation is one of the necessary elements of the
plaintiffs' cause of action, and without hard evidence, it is unlikely that
future suits will be successful. As a result of the litigation threat, beginning
with Pelman in 2003, members of Congress attempted to stop such frivolous
suits by means of a bill introduced in the Senate in 2003.11 The bill, known
as the Commonsense Consumption Act ("CCA"), 12 will be examined in
depth later in this article. In general, the bill prohibited civil litigation against
all food outlets, manufacturers, distributors, marketers, etc. based on a claim
of weight-gain, obesity, or any other health condition related to obesity or
4. Pelman v. McDonald's Corp., 237 F.Supp.2d 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) [hereinafter
Pelman I], refiled as 2003 WL 22052778 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 2003) [hereinafter Pelman
I], vacated in part as 396 F.3d 508 (2nd Cir. 2005) [hereinafter Pelman II], remanded
396 F.Supp.2d 439 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) [hereinafter Pelman IV], denied in part 452
F.Supp.2d 320 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) [hereinafter Pelman V], denied in part 272 F.R.D. 82
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) [hereinafter Pelman VI].
5. Pelman 1, 237 F.Supp.2d at 512.
6. Id. at 520.
7. Id. at 522.
8. Pelman v. McDonald's Corp., supra note 4.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Commonsense Consumption Act of 2003, S. 1428, 108th Cong. (2003).
12. Id.
2014]
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weight gain. 3 The bill was introduced again in 2005, 2007, and once more
in 2009.14 However, it has yet to pass.
15
This article will analyze the claims, arguments, relief, and
consequences of the Pelman case. Based on that analysis, a strong argument
can be made in favor of passing the Commonsense Consumption Act on the
federal level. However, its passage may raise some concerns that Congress
should first resolve. This article will first analyze the stages of Pelman in
detail, to serve as an example of what such litigation is like, and then proceed
to examine the effects of such lawsuits. Next, the article will take a look not
only at the federal government's efforts to address such litigation, but also
what individual states have done in response to obesity-related fast food
litigation. After a look at both litigation and legislative alternatives, this
article will summarize the pros and cons of each of these methods, along
with suggesting which option may be the best alternative.
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS
A. The Original Suit: Pelman I
This case was originally filed by two minors, Ashley Pelman by her
mother Roberta Pelman, and Jazlyn Bradley by her father, Israel Bradley.16
Both parents also made individual claims. 7 The named defendants were
McDonald's of New York, a New York corporation with its principal place
of business in New York, and McDonald's Corporation, a Delaware
corporation with its principal place of business in Illinois.18 Plaintiffs
claimed to have consumed food from the Bruckner Boulevard outlet and the
Jerome Avenue outlet, both of which are entities controlled by both
McDonald's of New York and McDonald's Corporation.19 This is because
the two entities work together in dictating ingredients and the quality and
quantity of the food provided to make sure that the product sold in a given
location is identical to the product sold throughout the rest of the country,
13. Id.
14. Commonsense Consumption Act of 2009, H.R. 812, 111th Cong. (2009);
Commonsense Consumption Act of 2007, S. 1323, 110th Cong. (2007); Commonsense
Consumption Act of 2005, S. 908, 109th Cong. (2005).
15. Id.
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and also because all advertisements and promotions are authorized by both
entities.
20
All of the plaintiffs had previously purchased and consumed
McDonald's food and claimed that this consumption caused them to suffer
health problems, namely weight gain and other negative health effects such
as diabetes, heart disease, high blood pressure, and high cholesterol. 2' The
gist of their allegations was that had it not been for McDonald's conduct and
business practices they would not have consumed the food in such large
quantities and would not have been injured.
1. Federal Court
Plaintiffs originally filed suit in August of 2002 in the state supreme
court of New York, Bronx County.23 However, the defendants then moved
to remove the case to federal court in the Southern District of New York in
September 2002, on the basis of diversity, alleging that the plaintiffs had
fraudulently joined parties to destroy diversity jurisdiction-meaning that
their intention for joining McDonald's of New York was to destroy diversity
and any hope for removal to federal court.24 Defendants further moved to
dismiss the complaint, while the plaintiffs cross-moved to remand back to
state court.25
The defendants McDonald's Corporation and McDonald's of New
York alleged that there was diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1332, which in sum says that to constitute diversity jurisdiction, the matter
in controversy must exceed $75,000 and the parties must be citizens of
different states.26 In Pelman I, complete diversity did not exist because one
of the defendants, McDonald's of New York, shared citizenship with the
plaintiffs, also from New York, unless the plaintiffs had fraudulently joined
the defendants to overcome diversity jurisdiction. 27 To prove fraud injoining
a non-diverse party, the burden is on the alleging defendant to show that by
clear and convincing evidence, there was fraud in the plaintiffs' pleadings or
there is no reasonable basis for liability against the non-diverse party in light
of the alleged claims.28
20. Id.
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The court ultimately found that the central issue was over-consumption
of products created, produced, distributed, and advertised at a national
level.29 The court concluded that the food would be the same at one outlet as
at another.3" Therefore, plaintiffs' cause of action is based on the national
menu and policies of McDonald's.3 As the court described it, "the plaintiffs'
real beef is with McDonald's Corporation."32 Therefore, McDonald's of
New York was released from the lawsuit, the plaintiffs' motion to remand
was denied, and the case remained in federal court.33
2. Analyzing the Plaintiffs' Claims
The court was then required to address the defendant's motion to
dismiss.34 In doing so, the court considered each of the five counts alleged in
the plaintiffs' complaint.35 Ultimately, the court dismissed all counts.36
a. Count I
Count I of the complaint alleged a violation of the New York Consumer
Protection Act by "deceptively advertising their food as not unhealthful and
failing to provide consumers with nutritional information."37 Section 349 of
the New York statute specifically makes it unlawful to use "deceptive acts
or practices in the conduct of any business, trade, or commerce, or in the
furnishing of any service in this state." 38 Section 350 of the statute makes
illegal "any false advertising in the conduct of any business." 39 In order to
properly state a claim under either section, precedent required the plaintiffs
to show that: 1) the act was consumer oriented, 2) the act was misleading in
a material aspect, and 3) that plaintiff was injured as a result.4"
Count I specifically alleged that the New York Consumer Protection
Act was violated by both acts of commission, e.g., claiming the food was
healthy, encouraging larger "supersize" meals without revealing the negative
29. Id. at 523.
30. Id.
31. Pelman I, 237 F.Supp.2d at 523.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 524.
35. Pelman I, 237 F.Supp.2d 512, 524 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
36. Id. at 512.
37. Id. at 524.
38. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW §349(a) (McKinney 2012); Pelman 1, 237 F.Supp.2d at 524.
39. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW §350 (McKinney 2012); Pelman I, 237 F.Supp.2d at 524-
525.
40. Pelman I, 237 F.Supp.2d at 525.
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hazards, and by acts of omission, e.g., by not providing nutritional
information to consumers.4 Count I relating to both commission and
omission was dismissed because the plaintiffs failed to plead a particular
deceptive act.42 The court found that an omission in failing to provide
nutritional information was clearly pled, but held that the plaintiffs had failed
to show why it was deceptive.43
b. Count II
The second claim again alleged violations of the New York Consumer
Protection Act, particularly by inducing minors to eat at McDonald's
establishments through utilizing deceptive marketing tactics.44 This claim
was dismissed for the same reasons as Count I-namely a lack of
specificity.45 The court held that the plaintiffs had failed to show any one
deceptive advertisement directed specifically at minors, and thus dismissal
was the appropriate action.4 6
c. Count III
The court characterized the next three counts, Counts III, IV, and V, as
based on common law negligence. 47 The elements of a negligence claim
consist of: a duty to conform to a standard of conduct for the protection of
others, a breach of that duty, a causal connection between the conduct and
the alleged injury, generally referred to as legal cause or proximate cause,
and a resulting actual injury.48 Count III specifically alleged that the foods
provided by McDonald's were inherently dangerous because they contained
ingredients such as cholesterol, fat, salt, and sugar in large levels.49
To properly state a claim for negligence, the plaintiffs must be able to
show that the food consumed was so unhealthy that it would be outside the
reasonable contemplation of consumers, or so unhealthy that it was
dangerous for its intended purpose." The court reasoned that it was common
knowledge that fast food contains such ingredients and that those ingredients
41. Id, at 527.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 529.
44. Id. at 524.
45. Pelman 1, 237 F.Supp.2d 512, 530 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
46. Id
47. Id. at 530.
48. PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 164-65 (W. Page Keeton et al. eds.,
5th ed., West Publishing Co. 1984).
49. Pelman 1, 237 F.Supp.2d at 531.
50. Id. at 532.
2014]
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are not necessarily good for the consumer.5 The court also noted that if a
person knows or should know of the probable consequence, it is not up to
the law to protect that person from that freely made choice.52
The court further stated that it would be nearly impossible to find the
required causal connection here without "wild speculation."53 The causal
connection referred to by the court was that McDonald's conduct in using
such ingredients substantially caused the plaintiffs' injury of weight gain and
related health problems.54 The court's decision to dismiss was based on the
lack of specificity in the plaintiffs' complaint, particularly in failing to
address such factors as the frequency of consumption and other health
considerations besides diet.55
Because the plaintiffs failed to plead that the hazards of consuming
such ingredients in large quantities was not well-known, and failed to show
some sort of proximate cause, Count III of the complaint was dismissed.56
d. Count IV
Count IV alleged a failure to warn of the unhealthy attributes of the
food McDonald's produced.57 A seller can be liable for negligence in failing
to warn if the seller failed to warn in general, or failed to give an adequate
warning of a risk inherent in the product's design that is related to the
intended uses of the product or related to the foreseeable uses of the
product.58
The question of whether a proper warning was given focuses on
whether the manufacturer, or producer, had a duty to warn in the first place.
5 9
The court noted that New York law dictates that obviousness and a
knowledgeable user will prohibit a finding of proximate cause, which is a
necessary element in proving negligence in failure to warn cases.6" The court
concluded that the plaintiffs failed to show that McDonald's food product
was any more dangerous than what would be known to the typical,
reasonable McDonald's food consumer.61 Because the possible dangers of
51. Id.
52. Id. at 533.
53. Id. at 538.
54. Pelman 1, 237 F.Supp.2d 512, 537-38 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
55. Id. at 538-39.
56. Id. at 539-40.
57. Id. at 540.
58. PROSSER AND KEETON, Supra note 48 at 685.
59. Pelman 1, 237 F.Supp.2d at 540.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 541.
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consuming such food would be known to a reasonable consumer, the court
found that there was no duty and Count IV was also dismissed.
62
e. Count V
The plaintiffs' final claim alleged that McDonald's sold addictive
products.63 However, the District Court concluded that the claim was
unclear.' The court found the claim could be interpreted to allege that the
addictive attributes of the food made it inherently dangerous, or that there
was a failure to warn that the food was addictive in general. 65 The claim was
categorized as vague because the plaintiffs failed to specify the
characteristics that made the food addictive, i.e., whether it was it the
combination of typical ingredients, or some other additive, and also whether
McDonald's intentionally produced addictive food.66 In the absence of such
specificity, Count V was also dismissed.67 In summary, the entire complaint
was dismissed with leave to amend.68
B. The Amended Complaint: Pelman II
Within the year, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint listing
McDonald's Corporation alone as the defendant.69 The plaintiffs narrowed
their allegations to only three causes of action, all of which were based on
violations of the New York Consumer Protection Act, as first raised in
Pelman L7 The defendant again moved to dismiss, and the District Court
was required to determine the merits of the amended counts.7"
1. Allegations in the Amended Complaint
a. Count 1
The first claim alleged that McDonald's violated the N.Y. Consumer
Protection Act through misleading publicity and advertising, which indicated
62. Id.
63. Id. at 542.




68. Id. at 543.
69. Pelman I1, No.02 Civ. 7821, 2003 WL 22052778, at I (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 2003).
70. Id. at 4.
71. Id. at 1.
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that the food that it produced was consistent with a nutritional, healthy
lifestyle if consumed daily.72
b. Count II
Plaintiffs' next claim alleged that McDonald's violated the N.Y.
Consumer Protection Act by failing to disclose the unhealthy attributes of its
food."
c. Count III
The final claim alleged that McDonald's practiced unfair and deceptive
acts by representing to the public that it provided nutritional information at
every outlet when in fact it did not.74
2. Statute of Limitations Defense
McDonald's, for the first time, raised a statute of limitations defense to
the allegations, based on the fact that the advertisements specified as the
basis for the complaint were the same advertisements used in the late 1980's
for which the New York State Attorney General had already taken action
against McDonald's.75 The plaintiffs were made aware that they could use
these advertisements to assist in making a claim, but any claim based on
these advertisements specifically would likely be barred by the three-year
statute of limitations for deceptive act actions.76
3. Dismissal
All three counts were dismissed for failure to state a claim.77 However,
in regard to the claims of the minors, the court held that the statute of
limitations does not begin to run until they reach the age ofmajority, eighteen
years old.78 The court therefore found that the claims of the two minors were
not barred by the statute of limitations, but the parent, adult claimants were
barred.79
72. Id. at 4.
73. Id.
74. Pelman 11, 2003 WL 22052778 at 4.
75. Id. at 5.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 12.
78. Id. at 6-7.
79. Pelman II, No. 02 Civ. 7821, 2003 WL 22052778 at 6-7 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 2003).
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Dismissal was again based on the failure to adequately plead
causation. 80 As stated previously, the plaintiffs must plead that the deceptive
act allegedly caused their injury.8 The court in Pelman II indicated that the
plaintiffs did sufficiently plead a causal connection between the deceptive
advertisements and their decision to consume McDonald's food, but failed
to show a connection between the consumption and their injuries. 82 Although
the plaintiffs' allegations were more specifically made in the amended
complaint, which addressed how much and how often the plaintiffs ate at
McDonald's, the complaint failed to consider many other factors that
contribute to obesity and their other health related injuries.
83
The court further stated that regardless of causation, the plaintiffs also
failed to show how the advertisements were objectively misleading, as
required by the statute.84 Although the plaintiffs relied upon several
advertisements, the complaint made no allegations as to the representations
about the effects of the food.85 The court reasoned that the effects of food
and types of food are different, and thus the advertisements could not be
found to be deceptive, based on the allegations laid out in the complaint.8 6
Because the plaintiffs failed to adequately allege causation and the
objectively deceptive nature of the advertisements, the complaint was
dismissed in its entirety.87 This time, the dismissal was with prejudice, so the
plaintiffs had no leave to re-plead.88
C. Appeal to the Second Circuit: Pelman III
The plaintiffs proceeded to appeal to the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals.89 However, the plaintiffs did not appeal the dismissal of the claims
under the Consumer Protection Act §350, so those claims were deemed to
be abandoned.90 Plaintiffs only appealed the dismissal of the claims based on
§349.91 The Second Circuit found that §349, as laid out in Pelman I, was
broader than a typical common law fraud claim, and therefore, did not
80. id at 8.
81. id.
82. Id. at 8-9.
83. Id. at 9-10.
84. Pelman 11, 2003 WL 22052778 at 10.
85. Id. at 11.
86. Id. at 11-12.
87. Id. at 14.
88. Id.
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require proof of the exact elements of fraud, such as reliance.92 The statute
specifically states that "deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any
business, trade or commerce or in the furnishing of any service in this state
are hereby declared unlawful."93 The court felt that the complaint alleged
more than enough to meet the requirements of the statute at such an early
time in the pleading process.94 Therefore, the District Court's judgment was
vacated and the case was remanded back to District Court.95
D. Remand to District Court: Pelman IV
After the Second Circuit held that the plaintiffs' complaint sufficiently
alleged deceptive and misleading acts pursuant to §349, the District Court
was left with two issues to decide: i) whether the complaint was too
unintelligible for McDonald's to properly respond, and ii) if that was found
to be true, what additions to the complaint were necessary for McDonald's
to adequately respond.96 The court was required to address these issues as a
consequence of McDonald's motion requesting a more definite statement.97
Once again, the court recognized that in order to state a claim under
§349, the plaintiffs must show: i) the act was consumer oriented, ii) the
alleged act was materially misleading, and iii) the plaintiff was injured as a
result.98 The court recognized that the complaint sufficiently laid out these
elements, but went on to say that sometimes one may lay out an adequate
legal theory, which may still not be sufficient to enable a defendant to
reasonably respond.9 9 The court found such to be the case in Pelman IV.'00
Before getting to the merits of the motion for a more definite statement,
the court noted that since the case was still at the pleading stage, the motion
would only be granted as to the portions where required information was not
provided, making the complaint unintelligible."l '
92. Id.
93. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §349(a) (McKinney 2012).
94. Pelman 1II, 396 F.3d at 512.
95. Id.
96. Pelman IV, 396 F.Supp.2d 439, 443 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
97. Id. at 439.
98. Id. at 444.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Pelman IV, 396 F.Supp.2d at 445.
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1. McDonald's First Request
The court first addressed McDonald's request for a specific
identification of each of the allegedly deceptive advertisements. 102 The court
reasoned that although under §349 a general statement of deception is
enough, without knowing which representations allegedly injured the
plaintiffs, McDonald's could not in good faith admit or deny a violation. °3
McDonald's motion was thus granted with respect to this detail. 
104
2. McDonald's Second Request
The second detail requested was a description of why the
advertisements were materially deceptive, and as to this request, the motion
was also granted. 10 5 The court felt that a general allegation that
advertisements are objectively deceptive was vague.10 6 The court further
stated that McDonald's could not admit or deny the allegations without
knowing what made them objectively deceptive.'0 7
3. McDonald's Third Request
The third detail McDonald's requested was a confirmation that the
plaintiffs saw or heard each advertisement in New York, but this was not so
easily granted.'0 8 The court believed that the plaintiffs sufficiently alleged
causation under §349.109 Plaintiffs need not show reliance here, only that the
representation was objectively misleading and that they suffered an injury
because of being so misled."0 In order to show injury "by reason of' a
defendant's deceptive act, the plaintiffs must only briefly explain how they
were aware of the acts."' Therefore, the Court ordered the plaintiffs to only
provide a brief explanation of how they were made aware of these alleged
deceptive schemes, and they were not required to go into such extensive










111. Pelman IV, 396 F.Supp.2d at 446.
112. Id.
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4. McDonald's Final Request
McDonald's lastly requested a description of how exactly the
advertisements allegedly injured the plaintiffs.113 Because the Second Circuit
held that the complaint sufficiently stated a claim, the court ruled that the
plaintiffs need not provide an explanation of how the advertisements injured
them, plaintiffs must only outline the injuries suffered "by reason of'
McDonald's conduct. 1 4 In summary, McDonald's motion was granted,
giving the plaintiffs the opportunity to provide these explanations.115
E. The Second Amended Complaint: Pelman V
Plaintiffs next filed an amended complaint and McDonald's moved to
strike and dismiss.1 16 In response to the order for a more definite statement,
the court found that the plaintiffs properly identified several allegedly
deceptive advertisements, and explained why those advertisements were
objectively deceptive. 7 The plaintiffs alleged that they became aware of the
alleged deceptive schemes from exposure to mass media outlets, such as
television, radio, magazines, posters, etc. in New York from 1985-2002.118
In addition, the plaintiffs alleged that their beliefs about the nutritional value
of the food were also influenced by other misled third parties.11 9 The
complaint went on to provide a list of injuries the plaintiffs suffered,
including obesity, high cholesterol, increased factors of coronary heart
disease, pediatric diabetes, high blood pressure, and other adverse health
effects or diseases causally connected to long-term consumption of
McDonald's food products.120
The District Court found that the plaintiffs had sufficiently detailed
how they were made aware of the alleged deceptive schemes. 21 The court
noted that the plaintiffs need not have seen or heard each advertisement, but
just plead that they were exposed to them in some form or fashion. 
122
Also, contrary to McDonald's beliefs, the second amended complaint's




116. Pelman V, 452 F.Supp.2d 320, 321 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).




121. Pelman V, 452 F.Supp.2d at 324.
122. Id.
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for McDonald's to respond. 23 The 2dAC went on to outline portions of the
food consumed, frequency of consumption of specific food items, and the
time frame of the consumption of the food. 124 The 2dAC also included
allegations that the plaintiffs' body weight exceeded the Body Mass Index,
which would classify them as obese. 125 The court deemed this to be a
sufficient outline of the injuries suffered.
126
The 2dAC identified forty specific, allegedly deceptive advertisements,
along with a statement of intention to include other advertisements at a later
date. 127 However, this inclusion of the possibility of other unidentified
advertisements to be later introduced, would lead McDonald's unable to
fully respond to the complaint. 28 Therefore, the complaint was limited to
those forty advertisements with leave to amend other advertisements only
with good cause shown. 129 The 2dAC also mentioned a french fry
advertisement in which McDonald's claimed that its french fries were
"cholesterol free" or contained no cholesterol; however the court deemed
this specific advertisement to be objectively non-deceptive. 3 ° The court
reasoned that this was similar to its former ruling that a McDonald's Mighty
Kids Meal is merely puffery and cannot constitute a claim that it makes
children mightier, therefore this representation was stricken from the
2dAC.' 3' McDonald's motion to dismiss was denied and McDonald's was
ordered to respond. 1
3 2
F. An Attempt at Class Certification: Pelman VI
The plaintiffs next filed a motion for class certification.' 33 Class
certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) was found to be
inapplicable to this case because questions of law and fact, which would be
common to class members, would not predominate over questions as to
individual class members.' 34 Certification under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23(c)(4) was also deemed inappropriate because the pleadings did
123. Id. at 326.
124. Id.
125. Id.




130. Id. at 327.
131. Pelman V, 452 F.Supp.2d 320, 327 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
132. Id. at 328.
133. Pelman VI, 272 F.R.D. 82, 83 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
134. Id. at 85.
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not sufficiently identify a class of persons with identical claims and identical
injuries, as those claimed by the plaintiffs. 
1 35
Additionally, the court found that because counts 1, 11, and III claimed
identical injuries resulting from the exact same allegedly deceptive
marketing scheme, the three counts amounted to a single cause of action
under §349.136
1. Failing to Meet the Predominance Requirement of FRCP 23(b)(3)
Under §349 deception itself cannot be the injury. 137 The only injuries
the plaintiffs may claim under the statute are those related to the development
of the named medical conditions.13 8 However, proving the necessary causal
connection between consumption and injury would depend largely on factors
or characteristics unique to the individual. 139 Predominate inquiries as to
consumption and energy expenditure requires particular and individualized
inquiries into each individual's lifestyle.' Although there may be common
issues as to the allegedly deceptive marketing scheme, individual causation
issues would overwhelm those common issues and ultimately take
priority. 1 4 '
2. Class Certification under FRCP 23(c)(4) is also Not Available
The question of material deception is evaluated by an objective
standard.142 Such allegations may be common to the class who claim
exposure and injury.143 Although this may seem to apply to the case at bar,
the plaintiffs failed to provide the identities of other persons of the same age,
exposure, and consumption regimens that suffered the same medical
conditions in the pleadings.' The court must at least be able to infer that a
class does exist. 45 Because the plaintiffs failed to adequately plead the




136. Id. at 89-90.
137. Id. at 92.
138. Pelman VI, 272 F.R.D. at 93.
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143. Pelman VI, 272 F.R.D. 82, 96 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).




THE HAMBURGLAR, FRIEND OR FOE
Therefore, the court denied the plaintiffs' motion for class certification
because the plaintiffs failed to establish the existence of a class satisfying the
requirements of FRCP 23.147 Shortly afterwards, in February 2011, the
plaintiffs moved to voluntarily dismiss the action, which was granted by the
court-but with prejudice. 48
III. THE EFFECTS OF PELMAN
Now that the stages of Pelman have been examined, it is important to
take note of some of the effects of the suit. First, this section will identify
similar cases, and indicate how possible plaintiffs might be chosen. Next,
there will be a discussion of the obstacles to success that obesity-related fast
food litigation must overcome. A somewhat controversial litigation
alternative will also be mentioned in this section. Finally, there will be an
examination of Pelman as a defense strategy.
A. Similar Cases
During the same time frame as Pelman, a few similar lawsuits were
brought which alleged deceptive nutritional marketing schemes; some also
claimed obesity or weight gain to be the injury.
1. Klein v. Robert's American Gourmet Food, Inc.
In 2002, in the case of Klein v. Robert's American Gourmet Food, Inc.,
plaintiffs sued a producer of snack foods alleging fraud and violations of
New York Consumer Protection Act, §349 and §350.141 One of the injuries
for which the plaintiffs sought damages was weight gain. 5 The case was
settled for $3.5 million in discount coupons and $790,000 in attorney fees,
but the settlement was rejected on appeal in 2006 because the appellate court
found that the trial court failed to consider whether class certification was
147. Id. at 100.
148. Pelman v. McDonald's Corp., No. 02-7821 (S.D.N.Y. stipulation filed Feb. 25,
2011).
149. Holly E. Loiseau et al., Super-Size Lessons from the "Big Food" Lawsuits, 22 In-
House Litigator 1 (2007); Klein v. Robert's American Gourmet Food, Inc., 808 N.Y.S.2d
766 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006).
150. Holly E. Loiseau et al., Super-Size Lessons from the "Big Food" Lawsuits, 22 In-
House Litigator 1 (2007).
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proper. 51 The case was remanded back to the trial court, and there has been
no further action to date.
1 52
2. Reyes v. McDonald's Corp.
In 2006, the plaintiffs in Reyes v. McDonald's Corp. alleged violations
of Illinois and New York Consumer Fraud Protection statutes. 153 The court
ultimately allowed the plaintiffs to move forward with the case, on the
premise of seeking to enforce FDA regulations, but the plaintiffs were
restricted from arguing for the imposition of stricter FDA regulations. 
154
This case illustrates that the food industry has had some experience
with these Pelman-type lawsuits. However, it is important to note that a court
has yet to rule on the causal connection of obesity or weight-gain being
induced by a food distributor's fraud or misrepresentation.
3. The Original Pelman Plaintiff, Cesar Barber
Prior to Pelman I, in 2002, Cesar Barber brought what has been
characterized as the first "tobacco-style" litigation lawsuit against the food
industry in New York state court, in which he alleged that McDonald's and
other fast food outlets were responsible for his ill-health and that of the
consumer population he represented.' 55 "Tobacco-style" lawsuits are
designed to take losses early on in litigation in the hopes that more cases will
lead to further discovery, and will ultimately result in a high-payout.
15 6
Barber was a fifty-six year old maintenance worker, who ate fast food several
times a week for over twenty-five years and weighed two hundred and
seventy pounds.' 57 Since he was not the most sympathetic plaintiff, Barber's
attorney halted the proceedings, arguably because of the looming fear of a
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Holly E. Loiseau, et al., Super-Size Lessons from the "Big Food" Lawsuits, 22
In-House Litigator 1 (2007); Reyes v. McDonald's Corp., 2006 WL 3253579 (N.D. ILL.
Eastern Division, 2006).
154. Holly E. Loiseau, et al., Super-Size Lessons from the "Big Food" Lawsuits, 22
In-House Litigator 1-2 (2007).
155. Id. at 2.
156. Id.
157. Id.; Saul Wilensky, et al., Where's The Beej?-The Challenges of Obesity
Lawsuits, BLOOMBERG ( July 18, 2013), http://about.bloomberglaw.com/practitioner-
contributions/wheres-the-beef-the-challenges-of-obesity-lawsuits/; Barber v.
McDonald's Corp., KFC Corp., Wendy's Int'l Inc., No. 23145 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Bronx
County 2002).
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bad public reaction. 58 Barber's lawyer then went in search of a more
sympathetic plaintiff.'59 That same attorney thereafter filed Pelman v.
McDonald's Corp., making it the first real "tobacco-style" lawsuit against
the food industry. 6 '
B. Obstacles to Successful Litigation
The central question of these lawsuits remains: is the fast food industry
really a primary cause of the nation's obesity epidemic? The fear that
attorneys may bring these lawsuits with the goal of achieving a high payout
for their individual benefit is a disturbing thought. Although these lawyers
may be prepared for the struggle ahead, they may fail to take into
consideration that the success of tobacco litigation was hard-won and did not
come until scientific evidence established the causal connection between the
effects of smoking and health damage.' 6 ' It is unlikely that success in
litigation against the food industry would be much different than tobacco
litigation, based on the cases that have been brought thus far.
Particularly, success with tobacco litigation did not occur until it was
discovered that the tobacco industry had purposely concealed nicotine's
addictive components and harmful consequences.'62 This is much like the
difficulties plaintiffs currently face in suing the food industry-namely
difficulty in establishing a causal connection between fast food's advertising
and production of unhealthy food items and their obesity or other related
health problems.
The lack of evidence of harmful components of such food is just one
hurdle plaintiffs must overcome. Another is proving that such advertising
schemes employed by food outlets are objectively deceptive or misleading.
One last issue plaintiffs must address, which is somewhat dissimilar to the
legal issues, is the argument in favor of personal choice. Critics of fast food
litigation argue that choosing to eat a particular meal, however many times
a week, is a personal choice. For example, Representative John Schwarz,
while supporting the bill in the U.S. House of Representatives, made the
argument that obesity could only be controlled by taking personal
responsibility and that being in control of one's weight is a person's
158. Loiseau, supra note 154 at 2-3.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Bonnie Hershberger, Supersized America: Are Lawsuits the Right Remedy?, 4 J.
Food L. & Pol'y 71, 89 (2008).
162. Id.
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individual responsibility.'63 Such statements suggest that mass-marketed
food is harmful to one's health only if one allows it to be. Plaintiffs must
take into consideration that a jury might feel the same way.
C. An Alternative to Litigation
New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg attempted to address the
nation's rise in obesity by proposing a ban on sugary drinks, specifically a
city-wide ban on sodas larger than sixteen ounces. 164 The Manhattan
Supreme Court and a four-judge panel of the appellate division rejected the
soda ban, reasoning that this action encroached on the separation of powers,
and that such a ban should be dealt with by the legislature.'65 The panel
further said that such a ban went beyond basic health concerns and
manipulated the choices of consumers.'66
D. Defense Strategies
Opponents of fast food litigation view Pelman and similar cases as a
roadmap for defense. By looking at the flaws of previous cases, a defendant
may be able to create a strategy not only for an ultimate defense, but perhaps
for a favorable outcome early in the proceedings.
1. Divide and Conquer'
67
The first of these defenses might be best described as the theory of
"divide and conquer," which involves focusing on the unique issues of
individual plaintiffs to avoid class certification. 68 As noted previously, when
dealing with the injury of obesity, common questions of law and fact
typically will not predominate over individual inquiries into the health and
163. Jennifer Pomeranz and Lainie Rutkow, Efforts to Immunize Food Manufacturers
from Obesity-Related Lawsuits: A Challenge for Public Health, CORPS. & HEALTH
WATCH, (Aug. 17, 2011), http://corporationsandhealth.org/2011/08/17/efforts-to-
immunize-food-manufacturers-from-obesity-related-lawsuits-a-challenge-for-public-
health/.
164. Nin-Hai Tseng, Soda War's Greatest Irony: Big Gulps are Safe,
FINANCE.FORTUNE.CNN.COM, (March 13, 2013, 2:58PM),
http://finance.fortune.cnn.com/2013/13/soda-war-big-gulp/.
165. Julia Marsh, Appeals Court Upholds Ruling Slapping Down Mayor Bloomberg 's
Soda Ban, N.Y. POST, (July 30, 2013 3:29PM), http://nypost.com/2013/07/30/appeals-
court-upholds-ruling-slapping-down-mayor-bloombergs-soda-ban.
166. Id.
167. Loiseau, supra note 154 at 4.
168. Id.
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habits of each plaintiff.169 Therefore, this is often an effective strategy to get
the case dismissed early in the proceedings.
2. Attacking Causation
17 °
A second defense theory is labeled "attacking causation."'' The major
weakness of these cases seems to be the plaintiffs inability to prove that food
consumption actually played a role, much less a significant one, in causing
obesity or weight gain. 1
72
3. Exploiting Consumer Knowledge
17 3
"Exploiting consumer knowledge" has also been named as a defense
strategy. 14 In these types of fraud or deception-based lawsuits, the
knowledge of the plaintiffs is a defense.' 75 Because deception is measured
by an objectively reasonable consumer standard, the strategy is to prove that
consumers were aware of the risk.'76 Therefore, if such a consumer would
have known of the risk, so should the plaintiff.'77
While each of these may seem to be strong defense tactics for defeating
a plaintiff's case early in the proceedings, protectors of the fast food industry
argue that a stronger, more effective defense strategy is necessary. As this
time, the fast food litigation cases have apparent weaknesses, and are almost
guaranteed to remain in litigation for years. Until scientific knowledge
specifically links the consumption of certain food products to obesity, these
lawsuits will continue to be lacking in evidentiary support of causation.
Many commentators therefore believe these suits to be frivolous, and urge
Congress and state legislatures to step in to prevent them. Such persons thus









177. Loiseau, supra note 154 at 4.
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IV. THE COMMONSENSE CONSUMPTION ACT
This section will next examine proposed federal legislation as an option
to put an end to fast food litigation. The analysis will address each
introduction of the bill, discuss the bills' strengths and weaknesses, and
analyze the arguments for and against such legislation.
A. First Introduction - 2003
Over the years, the Commonsense Consumption Act (the "Act" or
"CCA"), also known as the Personal Responsibility in Food Consumption
Act, has been introduced in Congress multiple times.17 The bill was first
introduced in the House of Representatives in 2003 by Congressman Keller
of Florida.'79 Its purpose was "to prevent frivolous lawsuits against
manufacturers, distributors, or sellers of food or non-alcoholic beverage
products that comply with applicable statutory and regulatory
requirements." ' The bill was then introduced in the Senate by Senator
McConnell of Kentucky. 8' The Senate bill was similar to the House bill,
except that it specifically prevented lawsuits against those entities when the
relief or damages sought was related to obesity. 8 2 Specifically the Senate
bill excluded any: "damages or injunctive relief for claims of injury resulting
from a person's weight gain, obesity, or any health condition related to
weight gain or obesity."' 1 3 The House passed the bill with a vote of two-
hundred and seventy-six "yeas" and one-hundred and thirty-nine "nays,"' 184
and the bill was then placed on the Senate legislative calendar.'85 In the
Senate, the bill was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary who then
referred it to the Subcommittee on Administrative Oversight and the Courts,
178. Commonsense Consumption Act of 2009, H.R. 812, 111 th Cong. (2009);
Commonsense Consumption Act of 2007, S. 1323, 11 0th Cong. (2007); Personal
Responsibility in Food Consumption Act of 2005, H.R. 554, 109th Cong. (2005);
Commonsense Consumption Act of 2005, S. 908, 109th Cong. (2005); Commonsense
Consumption Act of 2003, S. 1428, 108th Cong. (2003); Personal Responsibility in Food
Consumption Act of 2003, H.R.339, 108th Cong. (2003).
179. Personal Responsibility in Food Consumption Act of 2003, H.R. 339, 108th Cong.
(2003).
180. Id.
181. Commonsense Consumption Act of 2003, S. 1428, 108th Cong. (2003).
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Final Vote Results for Roll Call 54, H.R. 339, 108th Cong. (March 10, 2004),
http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2004/rol1054.xml.
185. Bill Summary & Status, H.R. 339, 108th Congr. (2003-2004),
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d108:HR00339:@@@L&summ2=m&.
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needless to say the bills remained tied up in the Senate and neither came into
effect.
18 6
The bill's sponsor, Senator McConnell, spoke of the proposed bill as a
type of tort reform.'87 Senator McConnell noted that most people take
responsibility for the amount and kinds of food they eat, and thus the
consequences that go along with those decisions.'88 He also mentioned in his
introduction that these sorts of lawsuits show "the erosion of personal
responsibility in America."' 89 Senator McConnell pointed out that the bill
would not provide complete immunity for the food industry, but only granted
immunity against "abusive lawsuits."' 9 ° The bill would not bar suits alleging
knowing or willful violations of federal or state statutes, breach of contract
or express warranty, or claims relating to adulterated food. 9 ' Senator
McConnell further stated: "The lawyers are not really interested in
consumers, they are looking for a settlement, a big settlement."' 92 In a
memorable closing Senator McConnell mentioned that: "Making your own
decisions is what freedom is all about. And with freedom comes
responsibility."' 93
B. Second Introduction - 2005
The fight for the passage of the bill was not over so easily. The Personal
Responsibility in Food Consumption Act was introduced in the House of
Representatives once again in 2005.'9' The bill's language was exactly the
same as the Act introduced in the Senate in 2003.115 This time the bill passed
by a vote of three-hundred and six "yeas" and one-hundred and twenty
"nays,"' 96 and was once again placed on the Senate legislative calendar,
where it remained un-enacted.' 9
186. Bill Summary & Status, S. 1428, 108th Cong. (2003-2004),
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?dl 08:SNO1428:@@@L&summ2=m&.








194. Personal Responsibility in Food Consumption Act of 2005, H.R. 554, 109th Cong.
(2005).
195. Id.
196. Final Vote Results for Roll Call 533, H.R. 554, 109th Cong. (Oct. 19, 2005),
http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2005/rol1533.xml.
197. Bill Summary & Status, H.R. 554, 109th Cong. (2005-2006),
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d 109:HROO554:@@@L&summ2=m&.
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The Senate also saw the comeback of the bill in the form of the
Commonsense Consumption Act of 2005.'98 However, this time the bill
addressed its purpose from a much different perspective. This seems
somewhat odd, since the House had just reformed its bill to the same
language as the Senate's previous attempt. 99 Senator McConnell introduced
the bill once again, but this time the stated purpose was "to allow Congress,
State legislatures, and regulatory agencies to determine appropriate laws,
rules, and regulations to address the problems of weight gain, obesity, and
health conditions associated with weight gain or obesity.-
200
In opposition to the bill, Senator Leahy of Vermont argued that the Act
was "legislation to limit the rights of consumers. 20' Senator Leahy was
concerned that the Act would result in a blanket ban on lawsuits against the
food industry, and further expressed concern that a heightened burden on
plaintiffs to prove intent, along with the conduct itself, went too far.202
Although the Senate's bill would perhaps have been a better alternative
to address the rising incidence of obesity, rather than implementing a sort of
tort reform, the Senate's bill was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary
upon introduction, and there was no further action on either proposed bill.20 3
C. Third Introduction - 2007
The Commonsense Consumption Act was introduced in both the House
and the Senate in May of 2007.24 This time both bills were introduced with
the same title, and both used the same language as the original bill introduced
in the Senate in 2003.205 However, once again, neither of these bills
passed.20 6
198. Commonsense Consumption Act of 2005, S. 908, 109th Cong. (2005).
199. Personal Responsibility in Food Consumption Act of 2005, H.R. 554, 109th Cong.
(2005).
200. Commonsense Consumption Act of 2005, S. 908, 109th Cong. (2005).
201. 109 CONG. REC. S6056 (daily ed. June 19, 2006) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
202. Id.
203. Bill Summary & Status, S. 908, 109th Cong. (2005-2006),
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?dl 09:SN00908:@@@L&summ2=m&.
204. Commonsense Consumption Act of 2007, H.R. 2183, 1 10th Cong. (2007);
Commonsense Consumption Act of 2007, S. 1323, 110th Cong. (2007).
205. Commonsense Consumption Act of 2007, H.R. 2183, 110th Cong. (2007);
Commonsense Consumption Act of 2007, S. 1323, 110th Cong. (2007).
206. There was no roll call vote on the House bill and last action on the bill was its
recommendation to the Subcommittee on Commercial & Administrative Law. See
Cosponsors, H.R. 2183,110th Cong. (2007-2008), http:/ibeta.congress.gov/bill/l 10gh-
congress/house-bill/2183/cosponsors; Bill Summary & Status, S. 1323, 11 0th Cong.
(2007-2008),
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D. The Final Introduction - 2009
The bill was introduced in the House of Representatives a final time as
the Commonsense Consumption Act of 2009.207 The bill included the same
scope and language as the bill previously introduced in 2007.28 This bill also
failed to be enacted.20 9
V. OPPOSITION TO THE COMMONSENSE CONSUMPTION ACT
Why did the Act fail to pass? One reason is that several public interests
groups expressed concern about the consequences of the Commonsense
Consumption Act. Some of these concerns were specifically expressed in a
letter signed in opposition to the Act by several public interest group
leaders. 210 Those leaders were concerned that the bill provided blanket
coverage against liability to the food industry, and that too high a standard
of proof would be placed on plaintiffs.2 ' However, the letter went on to say
that "suits like the McDonald's obesity case do not exist."'2 12 While some of
their concerns may be legitimate, these leaders seem to have been
misinformed about the existence of such lawsuits, since at least a few of these
lawsuits were already active at the time of this letter.
VI. STATE LAWS AND REGULATIONS
Besides federal legislation, there is another alternative to putting an end
to fast food lawsuits-state legislation. State legislatures are taking matters
into their own hands by finding a way to address the problems at the heart of
the fast food litigation.
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d110:SNO1323:@@@L&summ2=m&, (in the
Senate the bill was read twice and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary, where
there has been no further action).
207. Commonsense Consumption Act of 2009, H.R. 812, 11 1th Cong. (2009).
208. Id.
209. There was no roll call vote in the House, and the bill was last referred to the
Subcommittee on Commercial & Administrative Law, where there has been no further
action. See Bill & Summary Status, H.R. 812, 111th Cong. (2003-2004),
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d 111 :HROO812 :@@@X.
210. Letter from Laura MacCleery, et al., Director, Congress Watch, Public Citizen, to
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Thus far twenty-six states have enacted Commonsense Consumption
Acts of their own.213 Each state has tailored the Act to fit the states'
individual interests, although for the most part, the state bills still accomplish
the same goals as a federal Act, if ever enacted.2 14 The majority of the state
enacted Acts offer civil immunity to almost every division of the food
industry against claims of obesity or other health related injuries from long-
term consumption of certain food products.2 5 Some states go further in their
Acts in order to protect government authority when enforcing certain laws
related to food.216 There are even some state Acts that impose hardline
procedural barriers for filing such civil action suits.
217
VII. THE MOST RECENT STATE COMMONSENSE CONSUMPTION ACT
By way of example, let us examine the most recent state enactment. In
2013, North Carolina became the twenty-sixth state to enact a Commonsense
Consumption Act ("NCCCA"), and these acts continue to be introduced in
various state legislatures.21 8
Those in favor of North Carolina's CCA argued that it would help
protect the state's small businesses from frivolous and expensive lawsuits.1 9
The NCCCA's primary sponsor, State Representative Ramsey, stated "It's
not their fault that I'm overweight," and further, ". . . we can't blame others
for the choices we make., 220 The NCCCA sponsors seemed to emphasize
personal responsibility as grounds for passage of the NCCCA. For example,
the bill's co-sponsor, State Representative Shepard stated that: "I think
you're responsible and accountable for your own self."
221
Opponents of the NCCCA included a few statewide public interest
groups.222 Such opponents argued that instead of protecting people, the bill
213. Posts Tagged 'common sense consumption acts,' Study of State Cheeseburger







219. The Commonsense Consumption Act, NCHOUSEl17.cOM, (July 11, 2013),
http://nchouse 117.com/the-commonsense-consumption-act/.
220. Id.
221. Holly West, "Big Gulp" Bill Going Down Slow in General Assembly, N.C.
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protected companies, and further worried that the bill would not allow
municipalities to adequately fight obesity.
223
North Carolina's CCA passed both Houses with an overwhelming
majority. 224 North Carolina's version of the CCA protects the same entities
as proposed by the federal CCA, against claims arising from obesity, weight-
gain, and other related health conditions, but only on the condition that they
"comply with applicable statutory and regulatory requirements. '225 The
North Carolina CCA also included a specific provision relating to soft
drinks; in order to "to clarify that local governments may not regulate the
size of soft drinks offered for sale.
226
VIII. CONCLUSION
After considering the effects and consequences of both litigation and
legislation as it relates to obesity-related lawsuits against the food industry,
there is still no clear answer as to an effective solution--or even as to who
is on the right side of the battle.
A. Litigation
At this time, litigation seems to be a lost cause. Without current
scientific evidence linking long-term consumption of a food item or its
attributes to obesity, an adequate legal claim is difficult to accomplish.
Furthermore, a claimed injury of obesity requires such specific individual
inquiry into all sorts of unique lifestyle factors, that it is unlikely that a class
action lawsuit will ever be appropriate. Until plaintiffs have more concrete
scientific evidence establishing the causal connection between a particular
food and their individual weight gain or health problem, these types of
lawsuits are not likely to be successful. As noted previously, cases such as
Pelman outline a roadmap for a defense rather than victory.
In addition, if the concerns about settlement-hungry plaintiff attorneys
are true, a plaintiff unaware of the realities of this type of obesity-related fast
food litigation could be involved in a lawsuit for years with little chance of
success. Protection of plaintiffs from this type of risk is another argument in
favor of a legislative solution.
Due to the fact that these lawsuits currently lack a plausible legal
theory, they will continue to be burdensome, rather than beneficial, to all
parties involved. As Pelman illustrates, obesity-related fast food lawsuits are
223. Id.
224. The Commonsense Consumption Act, supra note 219.
225. H.R. 683, 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 2013-309.
226. Id.
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expensive, time consuming, and exhaustive on resources, not only to the
parties involved, but on the judiciary as well. From this perspective, some
sort of legislative prohibition may seem like the answer; however, there are
some important, albeit dissimilar, concerns that accompany such an
approach.
B. Legislation
Now that the impacts of litigation have been discussed, it is necessary
to examine the alternative-legislation. A federal CCA would effectively bar
civil liability actions claiming obesity injuries against the fast food industry.
Therefore, cases lacking a causal connection linking obesity to specific food
consumption would no longer burden the court system, and what may appear
to be innocent fast food defendants. A federally instated CCA would also
provide uniformity. With a total of twenty-six states that have enacted their
own versions of the CCA, it is only a matter of time before there is confusion
about who can sue, where one can sue and what is prohibited. Such issues
will undoubtedly be left up to the courts to decipher, which could be
especially problematic for federal courts when having to interpret different
state laws. But if Congress were to enact a federal CCA, the results would
be uniform across the country.
The potential problem with such a definite ban is if at some future date
scientific evidence is discovered proving the causal link, injured plaintiffs
deserve their day in court. The current language of the most recently
proposed CCA would bar plaintiffs from filing suit, even if they successfully
established a causal link. Additionally, what if the food industry decides to
take advantage of this protection in a negative way, like including addictive
components to food products knowing there will be no consequences? While
this may seem unlikely and somewhat reckless, it is a possibility.
Furthermore, if such lawsuits are barred, there will not be much incentive to
conduct research on fast food consumptions' relation to obesity. If in fact
such a link ever comes into existence, it is possible that it may never be
discovered. Namely, this is because no one would be at the forefront of
litigation making such research and discovery relevant or even offering
adequate compensation for conducting this type of research. For example, if
tobacco had been protected by stringent, tort reform legislation the general
public might not have ever known about the health consequences of
smoking, and injured plaintiffs might never have been compensated
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C. Where is the Balance?
The fact is that neither litigation nor legislation provides a perfect
means for dealing with obesity-related fast food lawsuits; currently litigation
is to the point of being frivolous and the CCA might provide too much
protection to the food industry. So where is the balance?
At this time the passage of a federal CCA provides the most efficient
means for putting an end to such lawsuits. While implementing a complete
bar on obesity lawsuits against the food industry may seem extreme, there
are ways around the prohibition should a scientifically proven causal
connection be found. For instance, the CCA may be repealed at any time. It
seems that if a link was discovered Congress would have few qualms about
repealing the Act to protect the public and compensate potential injured
plaintiffs. Another option would be to include a "sunset clause" in the Act.
Such a clause puts an expiration date on an Act and when the date arises, the
law automatically terminates and must be voted on again to be reinstated. If
the CCA was no longer appropriate, the expiration would provide a simple
way for the Act to be set aside, thus allowing plaintiffs to file suit, or if the
Act were still necessary it could easily be re-enacted. Not to mention, it is
much less stringent than an indefinite bar on a specific type of lawsuit.
Based on these avenues allowing plaintiffs a possible outlet to the
courts, the CCA does not seem as restrictive. Although there are concerns,
most of these are answered when one considers the options for getting around
the CCA. Therefore, at this time while it is not perfect, the CCA is the best
solution to prevent obesity-related fast food litigation that lacks a valid cause
of action.
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